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On the basis of an extensive interdisciplinary literature review proactive decision-making (PDM) is concep-
tualised as a multidimensional concept. We conduct ﬁve studies with over 4000 participants from various
countries for developing and validating a theoretically consistent and psychometrically sound scale of PDM.
The PDM concept is developed and appropriate items are derived from literature. Six dimensions are con-
ceptualised: the four proactive cognitive skills ‘systematic identiﬁcation of objectives’, ‘systematic search for
information’, ‘systematic identiﬁcation of alternatives’, and ‘using a decision radar’, and the two proactive per-
sonality traits ‘showing initiative’ and ‘striving for improvement’. Using principal component factor analysis
and subsequent item analysis as well as conﬁrmatory factor analysis, six conceptually distinct dimensional
factors are identiﬁed and tested acceptably reliable and valid. Our results are remarkably similar for indi-
viduals who are decision-makers, decision analysts, both or none of both with different levels of experience.
There is strong evidence that individuals with high scores in a PDM factor, e.g. proactive cognitive skills or
personality traits, show a signiﬁcantly higher decision satisfaction. Thus, the PDM scale can be used in future
research to analyse other concepts. Furthermore, the scale can be applied, e.g. by staff teams to work on OR
problems effectively or to inform a decision analyst about the decision behaviour in an organisation.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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c1. Introduction
“If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend
55 minutes deﬁning the problem and ﬁve minutes resolving it.”
Albert Einstein
In the last decades, the methods in Operational Research (OR)
made substantial progress. Researchers developed methods, which
can be used to “solve problems” about which earlier generations had
dreamt. These OR methods have a great positive impact on the qual-
ity of individual and organisational decisions. In line with the fa-
mous quote from Albert Einstein it is important to spend effort in
deﬁning a problem. The more appropriate the problem is deﬁned and
structured, the greater the potential for positive impact of OR meth-
ods. This paper contributes to skilful problem structuring by pro-
viding a new concept concerning proactive decision-making and an∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 921 556194.
E-mail addresses: Johannes.Siebert@uni-bayreuth.de (J. Siebert), reinhard.kunz@
uni-bayreuth.de (R. Kunz).
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0377-2217/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undempirically validated scale that measures proactive cognitive skills
nd personality traits to support making better decisions.
Woolley and Pidd (1981, p. 197) described problem structuring
s “the process by which the initially presented set of conditions is
ranslated into a set of problems, issues and questions suﬃciently
ell deﬁned to allow speciﬁc research action.” In theory and prac-
ice, problem structuring methods have gainedmore andmore atten-
ion (Franco &Montibeller, 2010;Mingers & Rosenhead, 2001; Tavella
Papadopoulos, 2014). Problem structuring methods (PSM) are de-
cribed by Rosenhead (2013, p. 1162) as a “broad group of model-
ased problem handling approaches whose purpose is to assist in
he structuring of problems rather than directly to derive a solution.”
hese methods are most frequently applied by groups and are char-
cterised by participation and interactivity (Rosenhead, 2013).
Franco and Meadows (2007) indicated that McGrath’s (1984) cir-
umplex is the most accepted framework for group decision sup-
ort, theory, and research. McGrath identiﬁes four basic actions that
eed to be performed in a decision related meeting: generating,
hoosing, negotiating, and executing decisions. The main tasks of
group contain generating alternatives (i.e. ideas, plans, strategies,
tc.) and negotiating conﬂicting preferences. “Within the context of ar the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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(SM-supported process, groups will engage in information gather-
ng and the designing of strategic options (generate). They will also
tructure and evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of
ifferent strategic options before selecting a problem focus and/or a
ourse of action (negotiate)” (Franco &Meadows, 2007, p. 1624). Both
enerating as well as negotiating are crucial for success. However, we
rgue that a reasonable result in a generation phase is prerequisite
or an effective negotiation phase. Therefore, we are convinced that a
ocus on the generating tasks is crucial to success.
Many studies recommend that cognitive styles and decision-
aking styles do have an impact on individual decision-making (e.g.
pstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Novak & Hoffman, 2009;
cott & Bruce, 1995), and on group decision-making processes (e.g.
ough & Ogilvie, 2005; Schwenk, 1995). This applies also for the
esign, use and acceptance of group decision support systems (e.g.
enbasat & Dexter, 1982; Lu, Yu, & Lu, 2001; Taylor, 2004).
As a support for group decision-making Franco and Meadows
2007) emphasise the importance of cognitive style in PSM research
nd application. They pioneered in systematically analysing the im-
act of Jung’s (1971) theory of psychological types in context of PSM
nd derive logically from literature eight hypotheses, e.g. that “sens-
ng and intuitive individuals will play a lead role during option de-
igning tasks, in comparison to thinking and feeling individuals” (p.
626). Garﬁeld, Taylor, Dennis, and Satzinger (2001) identiﬁed em-
irically that innovative, radical alternatives are created by intuitive
nd feeling individuals more often than by sensing and thinking
ndividuals.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing psychological
ests and scales are suited for explaining the process of “generating”
omprehensively. In particular, it is of interest which skills individu-
ls have in the generating phase and how much and why they take
nitiative. Research on decision-making lacks a psychometrically re-
iable scale for measuring proactive decision-making. In this paper,
e develop a scale that distinguishes four cognitive skills and two
ersonality traits relevant to the generation phase in PSM. Our scale
easures proactive cognitive skills derived from value-focused think-
ng and proactive traits derived from proactive behaviour.
Bateman and Crant (1993) deﬁne proactive behaviour as the rela-
ively stable tendency to effect environmental change. The essential
haracteristic of proactive behaviour is that “people can intentionally
nd directly change their current circumstances, social or nonsocial,
ncluding their physical environment” (Bateman& Crant, 1993, p. 104,
eferring to Buss, 1987). The prototypical proactive personality is rel-
tively unaffected by situational forces and interacts with its envi-
onment actively. Individuals classiﬁed as reactive, by contrast, are
elatively passive and are rather shaped by their environment than
haping it themselves (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). Proactive in-
ividuals actively search for opportunities, take initiative, and pro-
eed with their actions until they achieve their objectives (Bateman
Crant, 1993). Schwarzer (1999) develops a scale to measure the
ersonality trait proactive attitude, which can affect motivations and
mply actions. Proactive individuals have a vision and are driven by
heir values. They follow goals that they think are worth reaching for
Parker et al., 2010; Schwarzer, 1999). Bateman and Crant’s proactive
ehaviour and Schwarzer’s proactive attitude have in common that in-
ividuals show initiative and strive for improvements in their lives.
ndividuals cannot change their personality traits related to decision-
aking easily (VandenBos, 2007). However, Kirby, Kirby, and Lewis
2002, p. 1542) ﬁnd empirical evidence that proactivity can be trained
y the “development of context speciﬁc knowledge and skills”.
Making decisions, personal or work-related, is an essential part
f everyone’s life. However, not everyone and every organisation
ake good decisions. As it has been postulated and veriﬁed em-
irically, proactive personality traits (e.g. Seibert, Crant, & Kraimer,
999; Thompson, 2005) as well as proactive cognitive skills (Keeney,
992) can have positive impacts on an individual in decision situa-ions. It can be presumed that PDM enables people to make better
ecisions with results they are more satisﬁed with. Thus, we consider
DM to be a relevant concept that is worth being looked at in more
etail.
Research in OR focuses on best practices or on developing and im-
roving highly sophisticated methods (e.g. Corbett, Overmeer, & Van
assenhove, 1995). Hämäläinen, Luoma, and Saarinen (2013 , p. 623)
ndicate the importance of behavioural operational research (BOR) as
the study of behavioural aspects related to the use of […] OR meth-
ds in modelling, problem solving and decision support”. Lu et al.
2001) state that in OR applications, the personality as well as the
ommunication style of the decision analyst and the decision-maker
ay have a huge impact. Appropriate tools and methods for elicit-
ng information about the decision analyst and the decision-maker
re still needed, in particular in problem structuring, since hardly any
ehavioural research has been done “on the process itself and on the
ole of the analyst and problem owner” (Hämäläinen et al., 2013, p.
23). These tools and methods have to be selected “on the basis of
he skills, knowledge, personal style and experience of the analyst”
Hämäläinen et al., 2013, p. 624, referring to Ormerod, 2008). We de-
elop a scale to measure an individual’s behaviour in decision situa-
ions. Measurements on this scale can be used to select effective pro-
edures using OR techniques in consideration of behavioural aspects
nd to analyse behavioural facets in problem structuring.
In this interdisciplinary paper we explicate PDM as a multidimen-
ional concept that combines aspects of proactive personality traits
nd proactive cognitive skills in decision situations. We develop a new
DM scale and test it empirically in order to identify reliable and valid
easures. In particular, we pursue four objectives: ﬁrstly, PDM is con-
eptualised, i.e. the concept is deﬁned, clariﬁed by its dimensions,
nd differentiated from other constructs; secondly, the dimensions
f PDM are operationalised; thirdly, the multidimensional PDM scale
s empirically tested and validated in several studies; fourthly, deci-
ion satisfaction is explained by PDM.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we sum-
arise the theoretical foundation of proactive behaviour, decision-
aking, value-focused thinking, and basic psychological concepts. In
ection 3, we conceptualise PDM and derive suitable dimensions
rom literature. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the operationalisa-
ion of constructs and the methodology. In Sections 6 and 7, we sum-
arise and discuss the results of our empirical studies. In Section 8,
e discuss implications for OR, limitations, and further research. In
ection 9, we draw our conclusions.
. Theoretical foundation of proactive decision-making
PDM is based on different disciplines such as psychology, decision
heory, and behavioural OR. The term ‘proactive’ refers to personality
raits and cognitive skills. Therefore, PDM is framed by insights into
roactive personality traits and decision theories in general, value-
ocused thinking as well as thinking and decision-making styles in
articular.
.1. Proactive personality traits
Grant and Ashford (2008) point out that proactive behaviour in-
olves acting in advance of future situations. Individuals consider fu-
ure events in their current decisions with foresight, i.e. before they
ccur. Researchers describe this characteristic using the adjectives
future-focused’, ‘anticipatory’, and ‘forward-looking’ (Frese, 2006;
rese & Fay, 2001; Frese, Kring, Soose, & Zempel, 1996; Greenglass,
002). Proactive behaviour is characterised by the intention of hav-
ng a “discernible effect on the self and/or the environment” (Grant &
shford, 2008, p. 9). Proactive individuals are change-oriented and
nterested in creating a meaningful impact on their environment
Buss, 1987; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984). Reactive individuals,
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Nby contrast, are passive and react to, adapt to, and are constrained
by their environment instead of shaping it themselves (Bateman &
Crant, 1993). Proactive individuals have a vision and are guided by
their values. On the basis of a clear perception of what they want to
achieve they derive goals that comply with their vision. Schwarzer
(1999), who developed a scale to measure proactive attitudes, points
out that individuals’ purpose in life is deﬁned by striving for ambi-
tious goals. Parker et al. (2010) emphasise the generation of goals as
well as the endeavours to achieve them. Proactive individuals take the
initiative in pursuing personal and organisational goals (Frese & Fay,
2001; Roberson, 1990). Proactive individuals “scan for opportunities,
show initiative, take action, and persevere until they reach closure
by bringing about change” (Bateman & Crant, 1993, p. 105). Proactive
behaviour is considered to be relatively stable and cannot be changed
easily (Bateman & Crant, 1993). The same is true for proactive atti-
tudes. Habitual behaviour and attitudes are actualised inmany differ-
ent situations and therefore, are called personality traits or personal
characteristics. The VandenBos (2007, p. 950) deﬁnes a personality
trait as “a relatively stable, consistent, and enduring internal charac-
teristic that is inferred from a pattern of behaviours, attitudes, feel-
ings, and habits in the individual”. For our research we use the more
general term ‘personality traits’ to cover all of its subsumed aspects.
However, Kirby et al. (2002, p. 1542) ﬁnd empirical evidence that
proactivity can be trained by the “development of context-speciﬁc
knowledge and skills”. Therefore, we consider personality traits as
well as cognitive skills to be relevant dimensions of PDM.
Referring to proactive behaviour, Seibert et al. (1999) analyse
the association with endogenous constructs. They ﬁnd out that the
indicators of career success, i.e. the self-reported objective indica-
tor (salary and promotion) as well as a subjective indicator (ca-
reer satisfaction), correlate positively with proactive behaviour. Crant
and Bateman (2000) discover that employees who show proac-
tive behaviour are recognised as charismatic leaders. Furthermore,
Thompson (2005) links proactive personality to job performance con-
ceived by superiors. Thus, there is empirical evidence that proac-
tive behaviour may have positive impacts on individuals in different
contexts.
2.2. Decision-making and value-focused thinking
Decision-making is the process of making a choice between com-
peting courses of action (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). It is “a
dynamic process: a complex search for information, full of detours,
enriched by feedback from casting about in all directions, gather-
ing and discarding information, fuelled by ﬂuctuating uncertainty, in-
distinct and conﬂicting concepts – some sharp, some hazy” (Zeleny,
1982, p. 3). Furthermore, decision-making is regarded as a cogni-
tive process of choosing an alternative. Individuals and organisations
have only through decisions an impact on their situation (Keeney,
1992). On the basis of normative models of the decision theory, pro-
cesses can be derived as to how individuals should proceed in or-
der to achieve a maximum of their values, objectives, and well-being
(Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988; Howard, 1988). Furby and Beyth-Marom
(1992) summarise ﬁve steps of decision-making. First, possible alter-
natives have to be identiﬁed. Second, possible consequences of the
alternatives have to be identiﬁed. Third, the desirability of these con-
sequences has to be evaluated in terms of achieving one’s objectives.
Fourth, the likelihood of these consequences has to be assessed. Fifth,
the best alternative has to be identiﬁed among the generated set of
alternatives by combining preferences and uncertainty using certain
decision rules.
Howard (1988) emphasises the need to distinguish between deci-
sion and outcome. “A good outcome is a future state of the world that
we prize relative to other possibilities. A good decision is an actionwe
take that is logically consistent with the alternatives we perceive, the
information we have, and the preferences we feel” (Howard, 1988,. 682). However, because one never perceives all possible alterna-
ives and because uncertainty is associated with our knowledge de-
ived of generally incomplete information, a bad decision can result in
good outcome and vice versa. von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986)
onclude that a decision cannot be judged by its outcome. Usually, the
utcome is determined by several factors that cannot be controlled by
he decision-maker. Thus, the quality of a decision can only be evalu-
ted by the process in the course of which it wasmade and it has to be
valuated by looking at the stages of the decision process before the
utcome occurs (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). However, across
he life span, decision-making skills are related to obtaining good de-
ision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012).
Furthermore, Howard (1988) introduces seven elements of deci-
sion quality. ‘Decision framing’ deals with the question whether the
real problem is addressed andwhether it is framed appropriately. ‘In-
formational excellence’ refers to the cost-effectiveness of information
sources and the gathering of meaningful and reliable information.
‘Creativity – signiﬁcantly different alternatives’ implies appropriate-
ness of the effort put into the search for and identiﬁcation of creative
and doable alternatives. ‘Clear values’ refers to the process of gaining
clarity about values and trade-offs. ‘Integration and evaluation with
logic’ requires the use of logically correct reasoning. ‘Balance of basis’
makes the optimal balance of efforts a subject of discussion, e.g. the
efforts put into clarifying values, creating and evaluating alternatives.
‘Commitment to action’ deals with the clarity and straightforward-
ness that is necessary to communicate and execute a decision.
Keeney (1992) introduces a normative approach to PDM. The
paradigm of this way of thinking is that values provide the basis of
interest in a decision problem. In this context, values refer to what
someone hopes to achieve by decision-making, given a certain (set of)
alternative(s). Therefore, values should guide the effort made to solve
the problem. Values are explicated through an individual’s goals and
objectives, which serve as a starting point for the decision-making
process. Instead of following the traditional process of identifying a
problem, generating alternatives, and deﬁning criteria for the evalua-
tion of outcomes beforemaking a choice, Keeney (1992) suggests that
decision-makers seek out decision opportunities proactively. Such
decision opportunities could be created either by broadening an ex-
isting decision context or by recognising individual objectives that
might be improved.
Value-focused thinking provides numerous guidelines using val-
ues to support the search for more and better alternatives. The prin-
ciple is to create alternatives taking account of at least one of the val-
ues speciﬁed for the decision situation. In other words, people think
ﬁrst of what they desire (themselves) and then of possible alterna-
tives that are useful for reaching the desired objective (Keeney, 1992).
iebert and Keeney (forthcoming) identify that decision-makers are
ble to list only one third of their potentially relevant alternatives, but
igniﬁcantly more and better when being stimulated with objectives.
.3. Thinking and decision-making styles
Other relevant approaches to PDM are thinking and decision-
aking styles. Scott and Bruce (1995, p. 820, based on Driver, 1979;
river, Brousseau, & Hunsaker, 1990; Harren, 1979) speak of “a habit
ased propensity to react in a certain way in a speciﬁc decision con-
ext.” Thus, styles are neither of habitual behaviour nor of attitude.
he decision-making style here is, on the one hand, inﬂuenced by the
peciﬁc situation and, on the other hand, by a more general term in
orm of a habitual reaction. Apart from this understanding, we ﬁnd
any other constructs; however, they are not fully compatible with
ach other. Some deal with observable behaviour, while others refer
o internal processes. Some are derived from personality traits (e.g.
pstein, 1973), while others are derived from situational aspects (e.g.
ovak & Hoffman, 2009).
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aEpstein (1973, 1983, 1985, 1994, 2003) introduce the concept
f thinking styles, providing also implications for decision-making.
hey ﬁnd out that people use in general two different thinking
tyles: experiential and rational thinking. Experiential thinking is as-
ociative, emotional, of little effort, rapidly implemented but slowly
hanged, parallel, immediate, outcome-oriented, holistic, precon-
cious, and passively experienced with the process being opaque to
he individual. Rational thinking, by contrast, is logical, based on
he cause-and-effect rule, hierarchical, sequential, process-oriented,
lowly implemented but quickly changed, of much effort, oriented
owards delayed action, conscious, and actively experienced with
he individual being aware of and in control of the process (Epstein,
994, 2003; Kahnemann & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Smith &
eCoster, 2000). The Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI) devel-
ped by Epstein et al. (1996) has been used to measure individual
ifferences in dispositional tendencies to adopt rational and experi-
ntial thinking styles.
In contrast to these dispositional thinking styles, Novak and
offman (2009) deﬁne a situation speciﬁc thinking style as the partic-
lar thinking style or momentary thinking orientation adopted by a
onsumer in a speciﬁc (decision) situation. As Scott and Bruce (1995)
o, they emphasise the situational factors. In recent studies, Novak
nd Hoffman (2009) have considered situations in order to incorpo-
ate the different tasks or activities that consumers may undertake
s well as different motivations or orientations that consumers may
eveal when they undertake a speciﬁc task or activity. The situation
peciﬁc thinking style may be inﬂuenced by the task itself or by the
onsumer’s underlying motive for performing a given task, indepen-
ently of the task itself (Novak & Hoffman, 2009).
An individual with a rational thinking style will probably use cog-
itive skills for gaining and processing information. This can be done
ithout being noticed by others; it is also possible that this cogni-
ive approach precipitates observable behaviour. The use of cogni-
ive skills characterises how an individual approaches decision sit-
ations. These cognitive skills can be acquired through training and
ractice (VandenBos, 2007). In this paper, we concretise aspects of ra-
ional thinking in decision situations, in particular problem structur-
ng, using four cognitive skills derived from the proactive paradigm of
ecision-making in general and value-focused thinking in particular.
.4. Theoretical considerations
Proactivity can be manifested in decision-making by proactive
ersonality traits and a proactive way of thinking. While proactive
ersonality traits are regarded as a stable disposition in decision sit-
ations, the proactive way of thinking can be changed more easily by
raining the related cognitive skills (VandenBos, 2007). The distinc-
ion between personality traits and cognitive skills can help explain
he results of Kirby et al. (2002)), who have found empirical evidence
hat proactivity is trainable since cognitive skills can be trained.
It has been veriﬁed empirically that proactive personality traits
an have positive impacts on an individual in decision situations
Seibert et al., 1999). Although Keeney (1992) postulates positive im-
acts of a proactive way of thinking, these have not been veriﬁed
mpirically yet. Furthermore, we assume that proactive personality
raits and proactive cognitive skills complement each other, for exam-
le, reactive individuals who neither take initiative nor strive for im-
rovement will not be motivated to apply their cognitive skills effec-
ively. Similarly, proactive individuals who take initiative and strive
or improvement but have low proactive cognitive skills will not be
ffective in decision-making either. Proactive decision-makers who
re characterised by proactive personality traits and high proactive
ognitive skills should be most effective in their decision-making. To
nalyse such hypotheses it is necessary to conceptualise PDM and to
reate a scale that covers proactive personality traits as well as proac-
ive cognitive skills.. Conceptualisation of proactive decision-making
At ﬁrst, the meaning of PDM is speciﬁed. Our working deﬁnition
volved over time on the basis of an extensive and thorough litera-
ure review and several group discussionswith experts from different
cademic disciplines, and it is to be seen as a consensus. We generally
peak of decision-making as being proactive if it is value-/objective-
riented and self-initiated by a foresighted individual who strives for
mprovement. Alternatives are created systematically. Information on
pportunities and threats are gathered systematically, and potential
utcomes of an individual’s actions are anticipated. In our context,
DM can be characterised by (proactive) personality traits and the use
f (proactive) cognitive skills in decision situations (see Fig. 1).
In this section, we derive the four dimensions ‘systematic iden-
iﬁcation of objectives’, ‘systematic search for information’, ‘systematic
dentiﬁcation of alternatives’, and “using a ‘decision radar’” – which
epresent proactive cognitive skills in decision situations – from
ecision-making, in particular from the ﬁrst four of the elements
f decision quality (Howard, 1988), and the value-focused thinking
ramework (Keeney, 1992). Other aspects of cognitive skills, such as
he evaluation of alternatives, the ﬁnal decision, or the implementa-
ion of a decision, are not postulated as dimensions since there are
o fundamental differences between reactive and proactive decision-
aking. Individuals can acquire proactive cognitive skills intuitively
r by learning methods taught in courses, books, and papers on
ecision-making. However, even if individuals are experts at using
hese skills, they still have to apply them. The dimensions ‘taking ini-
iative’ and ‘striving for improvement’ are related to proactive person-
lity traits. Individuals who do not strive for improvement will have
o reason to apply their skills. In addition, even if there is a reason to
pply these skills, this person needs to take initiative.
.1. Dimensions of proactive decision-making
According to Schwarzer (1999) and Keeney (1992), proactive indi-
iduals have a vision and are guided by values. On the basis of a clear
erception of what they want to achieve they derive goals that are in
ine with their vision. Their purpose in life is generated by striving for
mbitious goals (Schwarzer, 1999). The anticipation and imagination
f objectives encourage individuals to pursue these objectives (Locke
Latham, 2002). Objectives are crucial for PDM. They are the basis for
ystematically creating alternatives, guiding the methodical search
or information, and planning decisions (Siebert & Keeney, forthcom-
ng). If individuals are not aware of their objectives in a speciﬁc de-
ision situation, they generally cannot be proactive in their decision-
aking. Therefore, the proactive cognitive skill of ‘systematic identiﬁ-
ation of objectives’ (Objectives) is assumed to be a dimension of PDM.
Reactive and passive individuals do not strive for more ambitious
oals or values, but they simply accept the alternatives given in a spe-
iﬁc decision situation, even if they are not content with them. Proac-
ive individuals, by contrast, try to createmore and better alternatives
Keeney, 1992). As previous research has shown, using objectives for
he systematic identiﬁcation of alternatives results in more and bet-
er alternatives (Butler & Scherer, 1997; Gettys, Pliske, Manning, &
asey, 1987; Jungermann, Ulardt, & Hausmann, 1983; Pitz, Sachs, &
eerboth, 1980; Siebert & Keeney, forthcoming). Furthermore, using
bjectives for the identiﬁcation of alternatives increases the likeli-
ood that individuals will actually achieve their objectives (Grant &
shford, 2008, referring to Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Brandstät-
er, 1997; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 1998). Training in the use of ob-
ectives for the creation of alternatives enhances proactive cognitive
kills in creating alternatives. If individuals are not aware of their al-
ernatives in a speciﬁc decision situation, they cannot be proactive in
ecision-making. Therefore, the proactive cognitive skill ‘systematic
dentiﬁcation of alternatives’ (Alternatives) that takes objectives into
ccount is considered to be a dimension of PDM.
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Fig. 1. Dimensions of proactive decision-making (PDM).
d
t
w
e
3
c
m
F
B
B
o
c
2
i
a
p
d
u
o
c
i
i
i
“
O
c
i
s
t
t
c
t
p
i
i
t
K
i
a
i
c
(
i
c
aThe relevant values guide the collection of information in a de-
cision situation (Keeney, 1992). A proactive individual searches ac-
tively and purposefully for such information that helps to evaluate
alternatives in terms of achieving the relevant values. Reactive in-
dividuals only use information that is available or easily accessible
and do not gather information systematically (Keeney, 1992). If in-
dividuals do not systematically search for relevant information in
a speciﬁc decision situation, they cannot be proactive in decision-
making. Therefore, the proactive cognitive skill ‘systematic search for
relevant information’ (Information) is regarded as a dimension of
PDM.
Proactive individuals are characterised as future-oriented (Frese
et al., 1996; Frese & Fay, 2001, 2006; Greenglass, 2002). They act in
advance of future situations. This includes not only the anticipation
of future events but also the prevention of future problems and ac-
tive creation of decision opportunities (Frese & Fay, 2001; Weick &
Roberts, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The use of objec-
tives for creating decision opportunities oneself may help to gener-
ate different and better decision situations. Furthermore, decisions
can be planned in a broader context and it can be ensured that the
right problems are dealt with (Howard, 1988). The planning of de-
cisions implies continuous involvement with decisions. Individuals
have inﬂuence on their decisions when they thoroughly consider
which decisions are to be made at what time. Instead of dealing with
any challenge in life operatively, isolated from other decisions, reac-
tively, andwith limited sight from aworm’s-eye view, individuals can
frame their decisions strategically, taking account of other decisions,
proactively, and in a future-oriented manner the bird’s-eye view. If
individuals are not continuously involved in current and future deci-
sions, they cannot be proactive in their decision-making. Therefore,
the proactive cognitive skill ‘using a ‘decision radar’’ (Decision Radar)
is considered to be dimension of PDM.
Proactive individuals take initiative in decision situations
(Bateman & Crant, 1993; Greenglass, 2002). They want to shape their
environment actively (Ashford & Black, 1996; Kim, Cable, & Kim,
2005; Saks & Ashford, 1996). If individuals do not take initiative in de-
cision situations, they cannot be proactive in their decision-making.
Therefore, the personality trait of ‘taking initiative’ (Initiative) is as-
sumed to be a dimension of PDM.
Proactive individuals strive for a “discernible effect on the self
and/or the environment” (Grant & Ashford, 2008). They are inter-
ested in creating ameaningful impact (Buss, 1987; Diener et al., 1984;
Grant & Ashford, 2008). Proactive individuals strive for improvement
in decision situations (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Parker et al.,
2010). If an individual does not strive for improvement in decision sit-
uations, they cannot be proactive in their decision-making. Therefore,
another dimension of PDM deals with the personality trait of ‘striving
for improvement’ (Improvement). The personality traits Initiative and
Improvement can be regarded as different facets of the commitment
to proactive action in decision processes and they result in different
degrees of effectiveness of decision processes. As long as individuals to not take initiative, even if they strive for improvement intensely,
his will not lead to proactive action in decision processes. Individuals
ho take high initiative without striving for improvement will not be
ffective in decision processes either.
.2. Proactive decision-making in the context of other constructs
On the basis of the working deﬁnition indicated above, the con-
ept is concretised by its six dimensions. In this section, these six di-
ensions relevant to PDM are differentiated from related concepts.
irstly, proactive cognitive skills are contrasted with vigilance (Mann,
urnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997), rational decision-making (Scott &
ruce, 1995), and rational thinking (Novak & Hoffman, 2009). Sec-
ndly, proactive traits are differentiated from buck-passing and pro-
rastination (Mann et al., 1997) and maximisation (Schwartz et al.,
002).
Using a conﬂict model, Mann et al. (1997) have found empir-
cal evidence for four basic patterns of coping with stress gener-
ted by diﬃcult, potentially threatening decisions: vigilance, buck-
assing, procrastination, and hyper-vigilance. Vigilance “posits a
ecision maker who clariﬁes objectives, considers alternatives, eval-
ates consequences, and thinks through how to implement chosen
ptions” (Mann et al., 1997, p. 5). On the basis of this deﬁnition, the
oncept seems closely related to PDM. To illustrate the concept of vig-
lance in the context of decisions in more detail, we discuss the six
tems Mann et al. (1997) used to measure vigilance. Some of these
tems are relatively similar to our proactive cognitive skills. The item
I try to be clear about my objectives before choosing” corresponds to
bjectives and the item “I consider how best to carry out a decision”
orresponds to aspects of Decision Radar. Since these two vigilance
tems may represent two different dimensions of PDM, they appear
uitable for our studies. However, regarding the other vigilance items,
here are huge differences in orientation and extent. The items “I try
o ﬁnd out the disadvantages of all alternatives” and “When making de-
isions I like to collect a lot of information” correspond to Alterna-
ives and Information. But, by using the terms “all” or “a lot of”, they
ut emphasis on the quantity of the information sought instead of
ts quality, i.e. whether the information is decision-relevant. A ﬁfth
tem “I like to consider all of the alternatives” implies that also bad al-
ernatives shall be considered in a decision situation. According to
eeney (1992), this cannot be effective. It is important to systemat-
cally create a broad set of good alternatives. The last item “I take
lot of care before choosing” seems quite general. In our study, tak-
ng intensive care before making a decision is implied by systemati-
ally searching for information (Information), identifying objectives
Objectives), and creating alternatives (Alternatives). In summary,
t can be concluded that vigilance addresses all of the four proactive
ognitive skills. However, the cognitive skills in PDM are rather char-
cterised by purposefulness than the amount of implementation.
Scott and Bruce (1995) identify four decision-making styles
hat represent the way how individuals usually react in decision
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Iituations: a rational decision-making style, an intuitive decision-
aking style, a dependent decision-making style and an avoidant
ecision-making style. Rational decision-making basically refers to
ognitive skills. It is measured by four items. The ﬁrst two items
I make decisions in a logical and systematic way” and “My decision
aking requires careful thought” generally describe the approach to
ecision-making. The other two items describe the speciﬁc actions
hat have to be taken to be rational. The item “I double check my infor-
ation sources to be sure I have the right facts before making decisions”
orresponds to our dimension Information and the item “Whenmak-
ng a decision, I consider various options in terms of a speciﬁc goal” cor-
esponds to our dimension Alternatives. Even though the rational
ecision-making style covers aspects of proactive cognitive skills, it
emains at a level that is too general to be applicable to our purpose
f measuring PDM.
Novak and Hoffman (2009) develop a scale for rational and ex-
erimental thinking. Rational thinking is characterised by a thorough
earch for and logical evaluation of alternatives. This style is mea-
ured by items such as “I reasoned things out carefully”, “I tackled this
ask systematically”, “I ﬁgured things out logically”, and “I was very
ware of my thinking process”. These items show that the concept re-
ains abstract and general. The items of the four cognitive skills of
DM, by contrast, provide insight into the speciﬁc actions, which have
o be taken so that decision-making is considered to be proactive.
Mann et al. (1997) ﬁnd empirical evidence for procrastination and
uck-passing as two aspects of defensive avoidance. The decision-
akers try to reduce stress by avoiding conﬂict through procrasti-
ation or transferring responsibility to others. Scott and Bruce (1995)
escribe the same phenomenon regarding the avoidant and depen-
ent decision-making styles. Frost and Shows (1993) develop a scale
o measure compulsive indecisiveness. These constructs provide dif-
erent explanations as to the question why an individual takes ini-
iative in decision situations. Concerning the concept of PDM, by con-
rast, it is of importance whether, not why, individuals show initiative
n decision-making. Thus, these constructs are exogenous to PDM, es-
ecially to the Initiative dimension, and may serve as an explanation
or the endogenous construct.
Schwartz et al. (2002) distinguish between maximiser and satis-
cer referring to the degree to which people select ideal alternatives
nstead of acceptable alternatives. While maximisers try to ﬁnd the
est alternative and never settle for second best, satisﬁcers tend to
hoose the ﬁrst acceptable alternative. The Maximisation Scale fo-
uses on the behaviour in a decision situation. The PDM dimension
mprovement, by contrast, refers to striving for improvement in both,
speciﬁc and general decision situation. It deals with the question
hether individuals are motivated to put effort into decision-making
n order to improve their entire current situation.
As mentioned above, proactive personality traits may have pos-
tive impacts on individuals in different contexts. Burnett, Mann,
nd Beswick (1989) identify a modest but signiﬁcant correlation
etween dimensions of Flinder’s Decision-Making Questionnaire
Mann, 1982), which uses, for example, vigilance, and course satis-
action of students. Since PDM is either based on these constructs
r at least related to them, we assume a positive impact of PDM
or the user. This assumption is supported by Keeney (1992) who
ostulates that using value-focused thinking, what implies the use
f proactive cognitive skills, improves an individual’s quality of life.
or proving this assumption, we analyse a consequence construct of
DM and have decided to use the adapted Decision Satisfaction Scale
Fitzsimons, 2000).
. Operationalisation of constructs
PDM is theoretically presumed to be a (multidimensional) con-
truct, which is not directly observable (DeVellis, 1991). The purpose
f this paper was to develop a valid scale being able to measure PDM.herefore, using the deﬁnition of the concept and its dimensions as
basis, indicators had to be found and examined in order to enable
ndirect self-report measurements.
Since PDM was an innovative construct, operationalisation had to
onsider the adaption of reliable and valid items from previous (re-
ated) concepts that had already been tested in other studies, which
ere as closely related as possible, however in different contexts; fur-
hermore, it had to consider the creation of completely new items
hat represent the content of the presumed dimensions (Netemeyer,
earden, & Sharma, 2003; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 2010).
riginal items that did not ﬁt perfectly were adapted to our context.
oncerning dimensions for which we did not ﬁnd an item in litera-
ure, we derived new items from theory. Those items were the re-
ult of several revisions by individual members of our research team
nd group discussions that reﬂect the agreement of the researchers
nd experts involved. Each item was translated by native speakers
rom English into German and vice versa to ensure content validity.
he original, adapted, and newly created items are listed in Table A1
Electronic Appendix). All derivations are documented.
To ensure consistency, reﬂective speciﬁed multiple-item-
easures were operationalised for each construct dimension
Bollen, 1989). In terms of wording, although some similarity among
tems was intended to tap the domain, items were phrased sim-
le, straightforward, and non-redundant, i.e. with a certain degree
f variety to express the amplitude of each construct dimension
Netemeyer et al., 2003, p. 57). However, this might interfere with
ome reliability and validity criteria, since part of the variation is due
o the wider formulation of the items. After analysing the data of the
re-study, some items had to be eliminated for reliability reasons
nd new items were added.
Since we were interested in the relationship between PDM
nd other constructs, Decision Satisfaction was operationalised by
hoosing appropriate items from a short version of the Decision Sat-
sfaction Scale (Fitzsimons, 2000) that we adapted.
. Methodology
At the exploratory stage, the construction of an experimental item
ool was useful in order to explore the actual dimensions (pre-study)
nd to ﬁnd reliable and valid measures. Multiple phases of data col-
ections were processed at the conﬁrmatory stage (main studies) in-
luding additional items for reﬁnement and validations of the PDM
onstruct and its dimensions.
A questionnaire was designed and ﬁve surveys with indepen-
ent samples were conducted. The questionnaire was piloted and
iscussed with experts before data collection in the pre-study. The
odel’s and item’s goodness (of ﬁt) need to be evaluated (Churchill,
979). The questionnaire was modiﬁed for the main studies. More
tems were tested and retested within this scale development pro-
ess (cf. Netemeyer et al., 2003).
The participants were asked to evaluate PDM statements on a
-point Likert scale ranging from (1) ‘disagree very strongly’ to (7)
agree very strongly’, also providing an ‘I don’t know’-option and to
valuate their satisfaction on an intensity scale from 0 (extremely un-
atisﬁed) to 10 (extremely satisﬁed). The ﬁrst two surveys were con-
ucted in German and data were collected by paper-and-pencil. Al-
ost all students participated at the beginning of a lecture. The third,
ourth, and ﬁfth survey were conducted in English and data were col-
ected by establishing an online survey in NovoEd, an online educa-
ion platform collaboratingwithwell-reputed universities in the USA.
he response rates were 28 percent, 27 percent, and 22 percent.
The data analysis during the scale development was guided by
lassical test theory. Factor analyses were employed to assess the
imensionality, reliability, and validity of the PDM instrument. Ex-
loratory factor analyses (EFA, principal component factoring in
BM SPSS with varimax rotation) were used in both, the pre-study
870 J. Siebert, R. Kunz / European Journal of Operational Research 249 (2016) 864–877
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iand main study I (initial testing of scale, exploring of multidimen-
sionality and judging of measurement items). As recommended by
Netemeyer et al. (2003, p. 149), we employed “EFA and item analyses
to trim/retain items for the ﬁnal form of a scale.” The factor struc-
ture (components) was proven to be highly reliable at the end of
the item selection process (eigenvalues, scree tests, total variance ex-
plained, communalities, Cronbach’s alphas, and item-to-total correla-
tions are used to explore the factors; according to Fabrigar, Wegener,
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). In addition, a covariance-based con-
ﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) in IBM AMOS, which was part of the
main studies (I and II a–c), served for conﬁrming dimensionality and
reliability as well as for further validation of the previously identi-
ﬁed construct structure andmeasures. The goodness-of-ﬁt was tested
by the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA ≤ .08), chi
square degrees of freedom ratio (X2/d.f.), Standardised Root Mean
Residual (SRMR ≤ .08), Normed Fit Index (NFI ≥ .9), Tucker Lewis
Index (TLI ≥ .9), Comparative Fit Index (CFI ≥ .9), and Akaike’s In-
formation Criterion (AIC). Fit statistics were evaluated according to
the thresholds recommended by Akaike (1987), Browne and Cudeck
(1993), Homburg and Baumgartner (1995), Hu and Bentler (1999),
and Arbuckle (2008).
In main study I (reﬁning the scale), reliability as well as construct
validity were tested by composite reliability (Nunnally, 1978), cross-
loadings between different construct dimensions and chi-square dif-
ference tests (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982;
Jöreskog, 1971). In main studies II (ﬁnalising the scale), reliability as
well as convergent and discriminant validitywere gauged by compos-
ite reliability (CR ≥ .6, Bagozzi & Yi, 1988), average variance extracted
(AVE) and the criterion established by Fornell and Larcker (1981).
Thus, the squared correlations between constructs – expressed by the
maximum shared variance (MSV) – should be lower than their cor-
responding AVE. Regarding the latter “[f]or newly developed scales,
values near the .5 threshold (>.45) seem reasonable” (Netemeyer et
al., 2003, p. 153).
Finally, structural equations modelling (main study II a–c) was
used to explainDecision Satisfaction (endogenous construct) by the
dimensions of PDM (exogenous construct) and gauge the nomological
validity. The inclusion of Decision Satisfaction (DSA) in our study as
a relevant outcome of PDM helped to better understand the inﬂuence
of each of the dimensions. It provided further information on the po-
tential effects of PDM and hypotheses for future research can be de-
rived. Applying these analyses multicollinearity among the PDM di-
mensions was tested by detecting variance inﬂation factors (VIF, Hair
et al., 2010; O’Brien, 2007). Furthermore, independent two-sided t-
tests were applied to prove the signiﬁcance of differences between
decision-makers’ degree of proactivity regarding their DSA.
All the PDM construct dimensions as well as the DSA construct
were measured at the same time and must be measured appropri-
ately by the subjects’ self-evaluations, since solely each individual
decision-maker can assess and report their own cognitive skills and
personality traits as well as their satisfaction with decisions, i.e. ob-
tainment of data from different sources or measurement in differ-
ent contexts was not applicable in our surveys. As a consequence,
common method bias may be an issue (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This was considered a pri-
ori during the design of our studies and data collections (MacKenzie
& Podsakoff, 2012), e.g. by separating predictor (PDM) and criterion
(DSA) variables in different blocks of the questionnaire, relatively low
complexity and short length of the surveys, emphasis that there were
no right or wrong answers, provision of an “I don’t know”-option,
limited reverse scoring, application of different scale types for de-
pendent and independent variables, voluntary participation, and pro-
tecting respondent anonymity. Commonmethod bias was further ad-
dressed post hoc by applying Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff
et al., 2003).. Pre-study
The pre-study pursued our third objective of empirically testing
he proactive decision-making (PDM) scale for the ﬁrst time. This in-
olved the empirical exploration of the construct’s dimensionality as
ell as the examination of its measures’ (new and adapted items) re-
iability and validity. In this ﬁrst study, the six potential dimensions
f PDM were tested: systematic identiﬁcation of objectives, systematic
earch for information, systematic identiﬁcation of alternatives, using a
decision radar’, taking initiative, and striving for improvement.
Data were collected in November 2013. The participants were full-
ime master students enrolled in business-related courses at a Ger-
an university. Overall, 188 participants, 97 males and 73 females
n average 23.2 years old, completed the questionnaire and needed
n average time of approximately 10 minutes. The responses of those
8 participants who were not German native speakers were excluded
rom the results, since their responses showed many inconsistencies
n the data.
An exploratory factor analysis with 19 items that represent the
eﬁnition of the PDMwas conducted. The principal component anal-
sis extracted ﬁve factors with eigenvalues over 1. The rotated ﬁve-
actor solution explained 61.7 percent of the total variance. We iter-
tively removed items depending on their communalities and factor
oadings and evaluated the consistency of each factor. In particular,
tems Ini_2 and Alt_6 were deleted because of communalities below
5. Items Rad_1, Rad_2, and Rad_3 were eliminated due to low factor
oadings.
As a result, the reduced 16-item-scale consisted of reliable and
alid measures. The ﬁve factors explained 66.1 percent of the total
ariance. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin value amounted to .759 and was
onsidered to be middling, i.e. it served as an indication that the fac-
or analysis was useful for these variables. Factor loadings varied be-
ween .581 and .836 (see Table 1). No item loaded more than .4 on
nother factor. Thus, the analysis of the factor loadings revealed that
ll items loaded high on the ﬁve dimensions.
Each factor represents one dimension of PDM. The explored fac-
ors can be interpreted as the following dimensions: Objectives,
lternatives, Information, Initiative, and Improvement. Conse-
uently, ﬁve out of six postulated dimensionswere identiﬁed through
xplorative data analyses. Since all of the items that correspond to
sing a ‘decision radar’ were eliminated, we could not verify the as-
umed sixth dimension of PDM. For this reason, ‘decision radar’ as a
otential dimension was operationalised by new items. Although the
actor loadings of Information were acceptable, the consistency of
he factor (Cronbach’s alpha) was very low. Thus, we decided to use
ifferent indicators in the main studies.
. Main studies
The main studies aimed at empirically testing the further devel-
ped and optimised Proactive Decision-Making (PDM) scale (third
bjective) by means of larger samples and at explaining Decision Sat-
sfaction (DSA) by the dimensions of PDM (fourth objective).
.1. Main study I
The participants in main study I were full-time bachelor students
nrolled in business-related courses at a German university. Overall,
67 participants with an average age of 20.53 years completed the
tudy within approximately 10 minutes. Three hundred eleven male
nd 243 female students participated. Thirteen participants did not
eveal their gender.
The EFA extracted six factors (components) with eigenvalues over
. Again, Cronbach’s alpha and item-to-scale correlations were exam-
ned. Unreliable items were iteratively eliminated and the scale was
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Table 1
Factor loadings and reliability measures (pre-study).
Factors/constructs/dimensions Indicators Reliability analysis
Factor loadings Cronbach’s alpha (corrected) Item-to-scale correlation
Objectives Obj_1 .691 .766 .550
Obj_2 .836 .635
Obj_3 .806 .614
Information Inf_1 .759 .325 .387
Inf_2 .619 .326
Inf_3 .581 −.082
Alternatives Alt_1 .655 .714 .498
Alt_2 .716 .366
Alt_3 .720 .585
Alt_4 .705 .579
Initiative Ini_1 −.775 .762 .574
Ini_3 −.759 .641
Ini_4 −.772 .594
Improvement Imp_1 .693 .796 .624
Imp_2 .805 .656
Imp_3 .784 .639
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Aeduced until it proved acceptably valid. During this process, items
mp_4, Alt_5, Ini_4, Inf_5, Obj_4, Ini_2, and Rad_1 were removed be-
ause of low communalities or low factor loadings. Concerning the
imensions Initiative (α = .625), Objectives (α = .714), and Alter-
atives (α = .759) Cronbach’s alpha could not be improved by ex-
ending or eliminating one of the items. We eliminated item Inf_1
f dimension Information because of its low item-to-scale corre-
ation to increase Cronbach’s alpha from .704 to .735. We included
tem Rad_1 of dimension Decision Radar because Cronbach’s alpha
ncreased from .706 to .742. As to the dimension Improvement the
limination of item Imp_1 increased Cronbach’s alpha from .800 to
840. However, Imp_1 remained because each factor should be mea-
ured by at least three items (Bollen, 1989) and the item tapped the
onstruct domain and was non-redundant.
Again, the remaining 21 items yielded six factors (components)
ith eigenvalues over 1. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin value amounted to
853 and was considered meritorious, i.e. principal component fac-
or analysis was applicable to these variables. The six-factor solution
sing 21 items explained 62.6 percent of the total variance. The ro-
ated component matrix is illustrated in Table 2. Only Obj_2, Alt_4,
nd Inf_3 (among proactive cognitive skills) loaded more than .3 on
second factor. However, no item loaded more than .4 on a second
actor.
The factor Objectives implies the active and systematic identi-
cation of relevant objectives in a decision situation resulting in
wareness of these. Information deals with the active and system-
tic search for information. Alternatives refers to the systematic and
urposeful identiﬁcation of promising alternatives using objectives.
ecision Radar implies future-orientation and purposeful planning
f decisions. Initiative describes whether individuals take initiative
nd change their environment. It has to be noted that concerning
he factor Initiative only reversely formulated, reactive items re-
ained. Thus, the items correlated negatively with their factor. How-
ver, scores were recoded for further analyses to simplify interpre-
ations of the six factors. Improvements deals with an individual’s
nherent desire to improve their situation.
The identiﬁed factors were conﬁrmed in a CFA, in which items
oaded signiﬁcantly and highest on their corresponding constructs
dimensional factors). Due to relatively low factor loadings and relia-
ilities, items Alt_1, Rad_1 and Rad_4were removed from the model.
he factor loadings of the remaining 18 items were predominantly
ithin the desired range of .6 and .9 (Netemeyer et al., 2003, p. 153).
lthough indicator reliabilities of Alt_2, Rad_5 and Ini_3 were a bit
ow, all values of composite reliabilities were acceptable and above
he threshold of .6 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). A certain number of tested
tems remained, reﬂecting each dimension appropriately.The four cognitive skills related factors correlated with .476 to
644 among each other and the two personality traits related factors
ith .307. Intercorrelations among all six PDM factors across cogni-
ive skills and personality traits ranged between .259 and .465. Dis-
riminant validity was further tested by single degree of freedom
ests. The chi-square differences between one- and two-factor mod-
ls for each possible pair of measures as well as the entire model
PDM) were all signiﬁcantly above the threshold of 3.841 (Jöreskog,
971; Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Thus, support for a suﬃcient level
f discriminant validity was provided in this study.
Overall, our PDM model showed a very good ﬁt of the data to the
heoretically derived model structure (Table 2). The global ﬁt indices
RMSEA, X2/d.f., TLI, CFI, SRMR) were within their thresholds; only
he NFI was marginally lower than the recommended criterion, but
ounded up to .9. Thus, the 6-factor model structure and its measures
t well and were used to further evaluate the PDM scale. Construct
alidity was assessed using multiple sources of data in main study II.
.2. Main study II
The participants in main study II (a), (b) and (c) were individ-
als who have enrolled in one of NovoEd’s online courses DQ 101:
ntroduction to Decision Quality by Carl Spetzler. We had indepen-
ent samples of three of these courses in 2014. The PDM surveys
ere administered and promoted by NovoEd before each course
tarted. Overall, 3872 participants, one third female and two thirds
ale, completed the surveys. The participants came from 132 coun-
ries, the majority originated in the USA. They mainly worked in
ndustries such as banking/ﬁnancial services/insurance, education,
nergy/utilities/chemical, manufacturing, technology, or transporta-
ion. Different groups of age were well represented: 39 percent were
etween 18 and 30 years old, 31 percent were between 31 and 40
ears old, and 30 percent were older than 40 years. After data screen-
ng, preparation and elimination of cases with missing values a to-
al of 3307 cases remained; 1245 in sample (a), 1071 in sample (b),
nd 991 in sample (c). Most of the participants had substantial ex-
erience in dealing with decision-making professionally: 31 percent
ore than 10 years, 18 percent between 5 and 10 years, 32 percent
etween 1 and 5 years, and only 19 percent less than 1 year. Further-
ore, 48 percent were both decision-maker and decision analyst, 15
ercent were decision-maker, 23 percent were decision analyst, and
nly 14 percent were none of both.
We used CFA to further validate the hypothesised model structure
f the multidimensional construct as well as measures. Due to low
actor loadings and high crossloadings with other factors two items
lt_4 and Rad_2 were removed and 19 items remained for further
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Table 2
Factor loadings and reliability measures (main study I).
Factors/constructs/
dimensions
Exploratory factor analysis Reliability analysis Conﬁrmatory factor analysis
Indicators Factor
loadings
Cronbach’s
alpha
(corrected) Item-to-scale
correlation
Standardised
factor loading
Signiﬁcance
factor loading
Indicator
reliability
Composite
reliability
Objectives Obj_1 .770 .714 .529 .688 ∗∗∗ .473 .717
Obj_2 .723 .571 .676 ∗∗∗ .457
Obj_3 .703 .500 .667 ∗∗∗ .445
Information Inf_2 .761 .735 .504 .619 ∗∗∗ .383 .751
Inf_3 .739 .615 .842 ∗∗∗ .709
Inf_4 .756 .576 .653 ∗∗∗ .426
Alternatives Alt_1 .730 .759 .467 – – .752
Alt_2 .588 .566 .617 ∗∗∗ .381
Alt_3 .713 .603 .663 ∗∗∗ .440
Alt_4 .510 .596 .837 ∗∗∗ .701
Decision Radar Rad_1 .603 .742 .496 – – .668
RAd_2 .660 .539 .649 ∗∗∗ .421
Rad_3 .659 .510 .673 ∗∗∗ .453
Rad_4 .644 .426 – –
Rad_5 .741 .580 .578 ∗∗∗ .334
Initiative Ini_1 −.782 .625 .464 .679 ∗∗∗ .461 .666
Ini_3 −.764 .422 .580 ∗∗∗ .336
Ini_5 −.697 .418 .634 ∗∗∗ .402
Improvement Imp_1 .731 .800 .535 .625 ∗∗∗ .391 .825
Imp_2 .872 .717 .877 ∗∗∗ .769
Imp_3 .835 .692 .828 ∗∗∗ .686
Overall model ﬁt RMSEA = .050, X2/d.f. = 2.035, NFI = .899,
TLI = .930, CFI = .945, SRMR = .045
∗∗∗ signiﬁcance level: .001.
Table 3
Factor loadings, reliability and validity measures (main study II).
Factors/constructs/
dimensions
Indicators CFA main study II (a), N = 1245 CFA main study II (b), N = 1071 CFA main study II (c), N = 991
Standardised
factor loading
CR AVE MSV Standardised
factor loading
CR AVE MSV Standardised
factor loading
CR AVE MSV
Objectives Obj_1 .804 .835 .628 .697 .836 .847 .649 .661 .824 .838 .634 .635
Obj_2 .813 .823 .823
Obj_3 .760 .755 .738
Information Inf_2 .737 .824 .610 .697 .698 .787 .552 .716 .708 .820 .604 .704
Inf_3 .837 .789 .847
Inf_4 .765 .739 .770
Alternatives Alt_1 .782 .846 .646 .605 .748 .845 .646 .694 .765 .852 .658 .637
Alt_2 .831 .849 .858
Alt_3 .798 .811 .808
Decision Radar Rad_1 .710 .824 .540 .689 .712 .822 .537 .716 .732 .837 .563 .704
Rad_3 .704 .674 .700
Rad_4 .756 .774 .796
Rad_5 .766 .766 .770
Initiative Ini_1 .803 .671 .509 .240 .773 .641 .476 .085 .813 .683 .523 .171
Ini_3 .611 .595 .621
Ini_5 .719 .657 .674
Improvement Imp_1 .790 .838 .634 .328 .807 .832 .625 .359 .783 .831 .623 .295
Imp_2 .877 .867 .863
Imp_3 .713 .688 .715
Overall model ﬁt RMSEA = .068, X2/d.f. = 6.690, NFI = .928,
TLI =.923, CFI = .938, SRMR = .057
RMSEA = .070, X2/d.f. = 6.680, NFI = .919,
TLI = .914, CFI = .931, SRMR = .058
RMSEA = .062, X2/d.f. = 4.745, NFI = .936,
TLI = .936, CFI = .948, SRMR = .051
v
a
t
ﬁ
f
n
m
X
I
S
d
tanalyses. Except for Ini_3 (.595) in study (b) all factor loadings were
above .6 and below .9 (see Table 3).
In all three studies the items loaded signiﬁcantly on the intended
factors. Across the three samples, the composite reliabilities (CR)
were good; compared to the other factors the reliability of Initia-
tivewas lower but acceptable. Evaluated on basis of AVE greater than
.45 for newly developed scales (Netemeyer et al., 2003), evidence for
convergent validity existed for all six PDM factors. However, the four
factors related to cognitive skills, i.e. Objectives, Information, Alter-
natives, and Radar, faced discriminant validity issues that had to be
considered in further analyses. They had relatively high intercorrela-
tions (between .732 and .830 on average across the three samples)
resulting in high MSV values that in main part were above their AVEalues. Intercorrelations among Initiative and Improvement (.260 on
verage) as well as between cognitive skills factors and personality
raits factors (between .281 and .572 on average) supported a suf-
cient distinctiveness. Indeed, the average shared variance of each
actor was below the AVE and the chi-square differences were all sig-
iﬁcant as well. Regarding the overall goodness, adequate levels of
odel ﬁt for RMSEA, NFI, TLI, CFI, and SRMR were found. Only the
2/d.f. ratios were relatively high due to the large sample sizes.
The six dimensions represent different facets of PDM. Objectives,
nformation, Alternatives, and Radar all measure cognitive skills.
ince proactive decision-makers who are cognitively skilled usually
eﬁne and follow their objectives, search for information, evaluate al-
ernatives and monitor their ‘decision radar’, it is apparent that these
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Table 4
Goodness-of-ﬁt indices for sub groups (main study II).
Groups N RMSEA X2/d.f. NFI TLI CFI SRMR
Neither decision-maker, nor decision analyst 448 .064 2.815 .916 .930 .944 .050
Decision-maker 513 .072 3.688 .917 .923 .938 .065
Decision analyst 774 .062 3.935 .924 .927 .942 .057
Decision-maker and decision analyst 1572 .069 8.425 .931 .913 .931 .059
Experience in decision-making less1 year 631 .061 3.366 .931 .938 .950 .052
Experience between 1 and 5 years 1062 .068 5.263 .932 .930 .944 .051
Experience between 5 and 10 years 576 .074 4.123 .902 .924 .923 .074
Experience more than 10 years 1038 .071 4.471 .918 .912 .930 .060
Table 5
Goodness-of-ﬁt indices and squared multiple correlations for the four substantive models (main study II).
Model RMSEA X2/d.f. NFI TLI CFI SRMR AIC R2
Model 1 Six 1st order factors: objectives, information, alternatives, radar, initiative, and
improvement
.059 12.481 .944 .937 .948 .050 2476 .305
Model 2 One 2nd order factor (cognitive skills): objectives, information, alternatives, and
radar; Two 1st order factors: initiative and improvement
.060 12.868 .939 .934 .944 .054 2669 .483
Model 3 One 2nd order factor (PDM): objectives, information, alternatives, radar,
initiative and improvement
.060 13.050 .937 .933 .942 .056 2738 .479
Model 4 One 3rd order factor (PDM): cognitive skills, initiative and improvement. One
2nd order factor (cognitive skills): objectives, information, alternatives, and radar
.061 13.109 .937 .933 .942 .056 2739 .466
Table 6
Fornell–Larcker criterion (AVE on diagonal, correlations and squared correlations between constructs above
and below diagonal), composite reliability and standardised path coeﬃcients for model 1 (main study II).
Obj Inf Alt Rad Ini Imp DSA CR Path coeﬃcients
Objectives .636 .816 .733 .809 .343 .572 .605 .840 .215∗∗∗
Information .666 .590 .791 .830 .295 .536 .575 .811 .057∗
Alternatives .537 .626 .649 .784 .405 .538 .655 .847 .375∗∗∗
Radar .654 .689 .615 .546 .281 .514 .642 .828 .304∗∗∗
Initiative .118 .087 .164 .079 .499 .260 .352 .662 .145∗∗∗
Improvement .327 .287 .289 .264 .068 .628 .349 .834 −.044∗
DSA .366 .331 .429 .412 .124 .122 .775 .912
∗ signiﬁcance level: .05.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcance level: .001.
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mimensions can be highly intercorrelated. Proactive cognitive skills
ay account for their substantial intercorrelations. Both Initiative
nd Improvement represent personality traits. However, even less
nitiative decision-makers may strive for improvement and vice versa.
n intercorrelation of these two (separate) dimensions may only be
ow. The same is true for intercorrelations across skills and traits.
A comparison of the goodness-of-ﬁt statistics of different groups
f professionals and experience levels revealed that the model struc-
ure was relatively stable across these groups showing similar results
see Table 4). However, the model ﬁt better for decision analysts and
ess experienced subjects. The pattern of factor loadings was very
imilar across all groups (see Electronic Appendix, Tables A2 and A3).
hus, measurement and factorial invariance was found.
.3. Explanation of decision satisfaction
By analysing the structural relationships between PDM and other
oncepts the nomological validity was tested. PDM was considered
s an antecedent of decision satisfaction (DSA). Since DSA was mea-
ured with an adapted short scale introduced by Fitzsimons (2000),
e ensured validity and reliability by another factor analysis. By ap-
lying the same procedure as described above, one factor was formed
ith high factor loadings among three items (Dsa_p, Dsa_d, Dsa_s).
In terms of the relationships between the six PDM dimensions,
ne has to consider PDM as being a higher order construct (Hair
t al., 2010), i.e. PDM as a second order or even a third order con-
truct comprising cognitive skills and personality traits as second or-
er constructs. Thus, in the context of other concepts one has to de-
ide which PDM dimensions should be included in which order. We
ostulated four substantive ﬁrst and higher order models andxamined their impact on DSA in a structural equations model (SEM).
he SEMwas carried out on the total data of main study II (N = 3307).
he goodness-of-ﬁt indices for the four models and the squared mul-
iple correlations coeﬃcients (R2) of decision satisfaction are pre-
ented in Table 5.
Although the four competing models all ﬁt adequately to the em-
irical data (again X2/d.f. ratios were high due to the large sample
ize), model 1 had the best overall ﬁt (RMSEA = .059), followed by
odel 2 and 3 (RMSEA = .060). A comparison on basis of AIC sugges-
ed that model 1 should be the preferredmodel, followed bymodel 2.
Multicollinearity should not be an issue when explaining DSA
ince the PDM factors had initially been extracted in an EFA, the reli-
bility of the measures as well as the explanatory capacity were high
nd sample sizewas large (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004). But to
nsure low multicollinearity, it was tested in linear regression analy-
is explicitly. The VIF values ranged from 1.121 to 2.553, i.e. all values
ere close to 1 and clearly below the threshold of 3 (Hair et al., 2010;
’Brien, 2007).
The six PDM factors and the DSA factor were intercorrelated (see
able 6 for model 1). However, with a composite reliability of .912, an
VE of .775 and a MSV of .429 the DSA construct was reliable, conver-
ent valid and discriminated suﬃciently from PDM, since support for
he Fornell–Larcker criterion was provided for DSA in relation to the
ix PDM factors.
In particular, the four cognitive skills factors were highly intercor-
elated, which was considered in model 2 and model 4, but not in
odel 3. However, model 4 is very abstract and its interpretation in
he context of other concepts is complex. Regarding the presented
igher order models 2–4 model 2 provides the lowest AIC value and
ight be an applicable variant for explaining DSA or other concepts,
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Table 7
Fornell-Larcker criterion (AVE on diagonal, correlations and squared correlations between constructs above
and below the diagonal), composite reliability and standardised path coeﬃcients for model 2 (main study II).
Cognitive Skills Initiative Improvement DSA CR Path coeﬃcients
Skills .798 .369 .602 .694 .922 .679∗∗∗
Initiative .136 .490 .258 .352 .740 .144∗∗∗
Improvement .362 .067 .628 .347 .834 −.033∗
DSA .482 .124 .120 .776 .912
∗ signiﬁcance level: .05.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcance level: .001.
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bwhen a conceptually distinct scale with acceptable internal consis-
tency is needed. In the following we highlight model 2. Regarding re-
liability and validity of Cognitive Skills as a second order construct
as well as of Initiative, Improvement and Decision Satisfaction as
ﬁrst order constructs, high levels of composite reliability as well as
convergent and discriminant validity were achieved (see Table 7; for
detailed results on model 2 regarding different groups of profession-
als and experience levels see Electronic Appendix, Tables A5 and A6).
Whereas model 1 explained about 30.5 percent of the DSA con-
struct’s variance, model 2 explained about 48.3 percent of DSA.
Both models were supported by theory as was conceptualised in
Section 3. However, model 1 allows for more detailed analyses of the
inﬂuences on DSA. Overall, regarding model 1 the standardised path
coeﬃcients of all six factors were signiﬁcant. Alternatives (γ = .375)
and Radar (γ = .304) had the strongest inﬂuence on DSA. Informa-
tion and Improvement had only weak impacts. Regarding model 2
Cognitive Skills as a second order construct had the largest impact
on DSA (γ = .679). The inﬂuences of Initiative and Improvement
were similar as in model 1.
The explained variances of 30.5 percent (model 1) and 48.3 per-
cent (model 2) respectively were moderate but acceptable since DSA
was only explained by one concept in this case, i.e. PDM. Consider-
ing the uncertainty in decision-making and the distinction between
a decision and its outcome (Howard, 1988) as well as numerous pos-
sible antecedents of satisfaction with one’s decision in addition to
PDM, such as anticipated regret, evaluation costs, choice conﬁdence
(Heitmann, Lehmann, & Herrmann, 2007), etc., and the distorted per-
ception of a decision, PDM represented a relevant predictor with sig-
niﬁcant explanatory power.
The average DSA of 814 participants with high Improvement
(mean: 6.584, standard deviation 1.484) was signiﬁcantly better than
of 2493 participants with low Improvement (5.682, 1.569). The av-
erage DSA of 1032 participants with high Initiative (6.910, 1.440)
was signiﬁcantly better than of 2275 participants with low Initia-
tive (6.114, 1.541). The average DSA of 1890 participants with high
Cognitive Skills (7.015, 1.280) was signiﬁcantly better than of 1417
participants with low cognitive skills (5.492, 1.459). All differences
were signiﬁcant on a .001-level (t-statistic). We concluded that Ini-
tiative, Improvement, and proactive Cognitive Skills were neces-
sary to achieve a high Decision Satisfaction.
Although procedural controls of method bias had been imple-
mented ad hoc, common method variance was gauged statistically
post hoc. By extracting a single factor in an unrotated EFA including
all manifest variables of PDM and DSA, in both main studies consid-
erably less than 50 percent of the variance was explained by a single
factor. Thus, common method bias had been suﬃciently controlled
and did not appear to be problematic in these studies (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). In main study II the common method variance was a bit
higher than in main study I. The reason could be that people respond
differently online than in a paper-and-pencil survey.
8. Implications for OR, limitations, and further research
The construct structure of PDM is composed of six dimen-
sions/factors (components). Acceptably reliable items ensuring valideasurements were created for the entire construct and each di-
ension/factor. The created and tested items serve as proxies for
he construct and its dimensions and are well applicable in research
nd daily business. Nevertheless, the contributions include that more
easurement work is needed on the relatively low AVE measures.
chieving high levels of convergent and discriminant validity among
imensions of a multidimensional construct is a long term objective.
ach dimension of the PDM construct should be re-evaluated con-
tantly and could be highlighted in separate studies in order to gen-
rate a high number of consistent multi-item-measures as well as
ingle-item-measures that discriminate adequately from other PDM
imensions as well as different constructs. Hierarchical conﬁrmatory
actor analysis multi-trait multi-method approach could be used to
xplore the validity of the PDM as higher order construct in future
tudies (Guo, Aveyard, Fielding, & Sutton, 2008).
We suggested two related models, a ﬁrst order only model, treat-
ng each of the six PDM factors individually, and a second order
odel, comprising the highly intercorrelated cognitive skills factors
n addition to the two separate personality traits factors. Since both
odels exhibit a similar goodness-of-ﬁt they can be applied depend-
ng on the speciﬁc research context. Our results are remarkably sim-
lar for individuals who are decision-makers, decision analysts, both
r none of bothwith different levels of experience. However, our scale
eeds to be further tested for different populations.
The PDM scale, as any other self-report scale, has the limitation
f self-evaluations. Some people may argue that decision processes
re mainly inner psychological processes. However, some parts of
he process are often observable. Therefore, it may be interesting to
nalyse if the results of self-estimation by means of PDM and ob-
ervations by other people (observers, superiors, or colleagues) are
imilar. Here, we can expect a high correlation. Thus, the multidi-
ensional PDM scale could be further validated by applying multi-
le methods regarding the correlation between the decision-makers’
elf-evaluations of multi-item measures on the one hand and third
arty observations, responses, or ratings on single-itemmeasures us-
ng a different scale on the other hand (Netemeyer et al., 2003, p. 80).
nvolving various data sources as well as data collections in multiple
oints in time also contributes to control common method bias.
The level of PDM can be used to group individuals. Individuals can
e classiﬁed and described as being proactive or reactive decision-
akers. In particular, PDM can be used for explanation and predic-
ion purposes in studies dealing with individuals’ satisfaction with
heir decision-making or actual decisions. Especially satisfaction is a
ulti-attributive construct, which is determined by a variety of dif-
erent factors. Many conceptual papers, empirical research studies,
nd experiments regard satisfaction as a mediator variable in cause-
nd-effect modelling. In our study, we found empirical evidence that
DM has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on decision satisfaction. Although de-
ision satisfaction is already explained moderately by PDM, further
esearch is required to identify other concepts and to analyse their in-
uence on decision satisfaction in combination with PDM. In future,
he consideration of PDM will enable academic, business, OR and
arketing researchers as well as psychologists to analyse individuals’
atisfaction as a predictor of behaviour in more detail. PDM should
e validated as a focal construct in a nomological network with
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sifferent antecedents and consequences as well as potential moder-
tors and mediators (Edwards, 2001; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Pod-
akoff, 2011). We follow Calder, Phillips, and Tybout (1983 , p. 113) ar-
ument that “[t]heory must be the driving force in designing theory-
esting research” and thus a theory can only be supported by con-
ergence, discriminant and external validity. However, the latter
s deemed as less important. Apart from concepts that are poten-
ially inﬂuenced by PDM (directly and indirectly), future research
hould also discuss and analyse the antecedents of PDM, especially
f each dimension. In this regard, research questions may focus on
he reasons why individuals are proactive in their decision-making.
s to that, psychological questions could be analysed. Each indi-
idual has a long learning history (e.g. operant conditioning pro-
esses and learning by models). Some of these results will inﬂuence
heir decision-making. In accordance with previous literature (e.g.
andenBos, 2007), we suggest that the cognitive skills can be trained
r learned more easily compared to personality traits. This presump-
ion should be veriﬁed empirically in a study in which participants
re given the PDM questionnaire twice, i.e. before and after a course
n decision-making. On average, the scores in cognitive skills should
ncrease while the scores in personality traits should remain stable.
he results could be used to optimise the course on decision-making
n respect to increasing the participants’ cognitive skills even more.
Franco and Meadows (2007) emphasise the importance of cog-
itive style in PSM research and application. The PDM scale can be
pplied in all research questions in which other scales are used to
ain more insights about the cognitive skills and personality traits in
ecision-making and problem structuring. Experiments on hypothe-
es derived by Franco and Meadows (2007) and empirical ﬁndings
Garﬁeld et al., 2001) regarding the impact of Jung’s theory of psy-
hological types in context of PSM could be complemented by a scale
hat covers in particular cognitive skills and personality traits that
re relevant in the generating phase in problem structuring. For ex-
mple, Garﬁeld et al. (2001) found empirical evidence that innova-
ive, radical alternatives are created more often by intuitive and feel-
ng individuals than by sensing and thinking individuals. The results
f Siebert and Keeney (2013) indicate that using objectives enhances
he quality and quantity of created alternatives. Proactive individuals
se objectives to create alternatives (Keeney, 1992). The PDM scale al-
ows identifying proactive individuals. Therefore, this scale may help
o understand why intuitive and feeling individuals are more produc-
ive in creating alternatives. Another example is that the PDM scale
ay be useful to explain individual differences and conceptual mod-
lling task performance (Dhillon & Dasgupta, 2011).
We have already discussed the aspect that PDM may be linked to
rocrastination and buck-passing (defensive avoidance, Mann et al.,
997; avoidant and dependent decision-making styles, Scott & Bruce,
995) as well as compulsive indecisiveness (Frost & Shows, 1993).
e expect that those individuals who buck-pass or procrastinate will
ave lower scores in ‘initiative’ and that maximisers will tend to have
igher scores in ‘improvement’ than satisﬁcers. In our conceptuali-
ation Section 3, we discuss the similarities and differences between
roactive cognitive skills and vigilance (Mann et al., 1997), the ratio-
al thinking style (Epstein, 1973, 1983, 1985, 1994, and 2003), and
he situation speciﬁc thinking style (Novak & Hoffman, 2009). We are
onvinced that proactive cognitive skills will be useful to substantiate
hese rational thinking styles. It should be further analysed whether
ational and vigilant individuals tend to have higher scores in proac-
ive cognitive skills compared to non-rational and non-vigilant indi-
iduals.
According to Murphy and Davidshofer (1998) there is a huge need
or psychological tests in practice and they deﬁned three major ﬁelds
f application for psychological testing, namely educational, person-
el, and clinical testing. For the application of the PDM scale mainly
he ﬁrst two areas are of importance. The purpose of these tests is to
lassify and assign the subjects to different categories, which serve asource of information and therefore as basis for a speciﬁc decision for
he observer. Furthermore, the results of the tests provide informa-
ion on certain characteristics of the subject (Murphy & Davidshofer,
998).
The PDM scale could be used in assessment centres to evaluate
pplicants regarding their cognitive skills and personality traits rel-
vant in phases of problem structuring and decision-making, similar
o scales like the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to ascertain a person’s
asic preferences. Applicants with low scores in proactive cognitive
kills and proactive personality traits (28.6 percent in main study II)
ould be regarded as less suitable for certain positions. The PDM scale
ould also be applied to personnel. Especially, at the stage of problem
tructuring, which is crucial for every OR application, it is highly im-
ortant to have individuals with high proactive cognitive skills in a
eam since even the best method or algorithm will be ineffective as
ong as the problem is framed wrongly. In almost all OR applications
t could be useful to have a team that consists of individuals with high
roactive personality traits and individuals with high proactive cog-
itive skills who complement each other.
Furthermore, the PDM scale can be used to capture behavioural
spects in OR procedures. Companies often ask analysts for support
n important and complex decision situations (e.g. building a new
ower plant, outsourcing of production, adopting new technologies,
tc.). For offering tailor-made support, the decision analyst needs to
nderstand the decision-making in a company with regard to the or-
anisation itself and its stakeholders, i.e. managers and personnel.
ompleting the PDM scale a week before the kick-off meeting is a
ost-effective option to measure the PDM of the individuals and the
ntire company. In contrast to individual conversations, this would
ave time and in contrast to group discussions, the use of the PDM
uestionnaire would prevent single opinion leaders from dominating
he results, since certain individuals often lead decisions in compa-
ies (Crant, 1996).
. Conclusion
This paper aims at developing a theoretically sound and empiri-
ally tested proactive decision-making (PDM) scale. Therefore, PDM is
onceptualised, operationalised, measured, validated, and modelled
ith regard to explaining decision satisfaction.
We derive the concept from previous literature and identify six
imensions that describe necessary proactive cognitive skills (1–4)
nd proactive personality traits (5, 6) of individuals: (1) a system-
tic and active search for objectives (Objectives), (2) a purpose-
ul and active search for information (Information), (3) a purpose-
ul and systematic identiﬁcation of alternatives (Alternatives), (4)
future-oriented and purposeful planning of decisions (Decision
adar), (5) taking initiative (Initiative), and (6) the inherent desire
o improve one’s situation by striving for improvement (Improve-
ent). By means of ﬁve studies, these six factors are identiﬁed of
eing of importance in PDM. On the basis of theoretical considera-
ions and empirical results, PDM can therefore be deﬁned brieﬂy as
ollows:
Proactive decision-making summarises the purposeful use of cog-
nitive skills and certain foresighted personality traits of the
decision-maker.
We argue that both, proactive cognitive skills and proactive per-
onality traits, are relevant aspects of PDM. Furthermore, we as-
ume that both aspects complement each other. The comparison of
he decision satisfaction of participants with low and high scores in
roactive cognitive skills and proactive personality traits respectively
mpirically verify this assumption. Since proactive personality traits
re characterised to be relatively stable, individuals should enhance
heir cognitive skills in decision-making to achieve a higher decision
atisfaction.
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